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Theoretical Philosophy Unit, Utrecht University
Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical prob-
lems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one.
I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal lan-
guage philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of
experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within lin-
guistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal lan-
guage philosophy. I argue further that some of the critiques of experimental phi-
losophy are in fact defenses of ideal language philosophy. Finally, I show howmuch
of the current debate about experimental philosophy is anticipated in the debates
about and within linguistic philosophy. Specically, arguments by ideal language
philosophers support experimental philosophy.
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1. Introduction
In the 20th century, philosophical method came under scrutiny by linguis-
tic philosophers, who claimed that all philosophical problems that cannot
be solved empirically can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language
or developing an ideal one. In recent years, philosophical method has again
been scrutinized, this time by proponents and opponents of experimental
philosophy, which uses experimental methods to investigate intuitions rele-
vant for philosophical analysis.
In defense of experimental philosophy, Knobe (2007) suggests that lin-
guistic philosophy is too restricted in its topics, and the philosophically in-
teresting questions should be answered with the aid of experimental phi-
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losophy. In defense of non-experimental philosophy, Williamson (2007) ar-
gues for a metaphysics based on counterfactual reasoning that leaves lin-
guistic philosophy behind. Linguistic philosophy itself has been defended
by Kauppinen (2007), who argues that intuitions about ordinary language
are best elucidated without recourse to experiment. However, not all lin-
guistic philosophy relies on ordinary language, and in the current debate
about philosophical method, proponents of ideal language philosophy are
conspicuously missing. is may be because “logical empiricism [has lost]
its status as a philosophical project to be pursued” (Richardson 2007, 346);
since ideal language philosophy was one of the main components of logical
empiricism, it, too, has lost this status (Kuipers 2007, §1).
e neglect of ideal language philosophy in the current debate on in-
tuitions and experimental philosophy is an oversight because, rst, the old
debate between ordinary and ideal language philosophy was never conclu-
sively decided. If the current debate does not resolve the old debate in favor
of ordinary language philosophy, ideal language philosophy is therefore as
much a contender now as it ever was.
Second, in the current debate, the philosophical relevance of experi-
ments on intuitions is sometimes challenged through an analogical consid-
eration that, on further thought, supports ideal language philosophy (if it
supports anything at all, given that it is only an analogy). Nadelhoer and
Nahmias (2007, 129) describe the consideration in the following way:
Upon rst hearing of experimental philosophy, many philosophers
conclude from the start that empirical data concerning folk intuitions
are irrelevant to philosophical debates because the folk intuitions
themselves are irrelevant to suchdebates. Aer all, scientists andmath-
ematicians tend not to worry about whether their theories settle with
the intuitions of lay-persons. Why should philosophers be any dif-
ferent? On this view, even if our own “expert” intuitions correctly
come into play when we’re doing philosophy, the untutored and un-
informed intuitions of the “person on the street” have no similar role
to play.
Under the assumption that “so-called intuitions are simply judgments (or
dispositions to judgment)” (Williamson 2007, 3), Williamson (2007, 191)
gives an elaboration of this consideration:
Much of the evidence for cross-cultural variation in judgments on
thought experiments concerns verdicts by people without philosoph-
ical training. Yet philosophy students have to learn how to apply gen-
eral concepts to specic examples with careful attention to the rele-
vant subtleties, just as law students have to learn how to analyze hy-
pothetical cases.
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In jurisprudence it may be even easier to note than in natural science or
mathematics that the concepts the experts apply are not those of ordinary
language. e concepts are highly rened and have been developed in sci-
ence or jurisprudence itself, sometimes but not always with a basis in or-
dinary language. It is this kind of concept that is applied in ideal language
philosophy.erefore, this consideration is no defense of ordinary language
philosophy against criticisms relying on experiments, but itmay be a defense
of ideal language philosophy.
Keeping the analogical consideration inmind, I am going to argue in the
following that some results of experimental philosophy, if correct, support
linguistic philosophy, some support ideal over ordinary language philoso-
phy, and some provide a friendly starting point for ideal language philoso-
phy. In the old debate about and within linguistic philosophy, experimental
philosophy thus strengthens the position of ideal language philosophy. As
suggested by the analogical consideration, I will then argue that ideal lan-
guage philosophy can be pursued almost completely independently of ex-
perimental research on intuitions. As a historical aside, I will also show how
many of the arguments in the old debate apply to the current debate about
the role of intuitions and experimental results in philosophy. Specically,
I claim that the arguments by ideal language philosophers support experi-
mental philosophy. To show this, in section 2 I will give an overview of those
arguments of the old debate that are relevant to the new debate, which I will
discuss in section 3.
2. e old debate about and within linguistic philosophy
Rorty (1967a, 3) denes linguistic philosophy as “the view that philosophical
problems are problems whichmay be solved (or dissolved) either by reform-
ing language, or by understanding more about the language we presently
use”. In linguistic philosophy, then, language reform or analysis alone are
sucient to either provide solutions to philosophical problems, or avoid the
problems completely. At rst sight, this is an implausible position, for the
answers to many questions traditionally considered philosophical (say, the
question of determinism or the existence of exactly one god) quite obvi-
ously need more than language reform or analysis. It seems that whether
the world is deterministic should depend on what the world is like, and thus
be informed by our theories of the world, and the existence of exactly one
god will be more or less plausible given alternative explanations of the phe-
nomena that occur.
Rorty’s denition has to be understood to pertain to philosophy’s con-
tribution to the solution of problems. To the extent that empirical science
can solve a problem on its own, philosophy does not have a role to play.
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Philosophy’s role is to solve or dissolve what is le of a problem when all
the empirical work is done. As the extensive use and discussion of empir-
ical results within logical empiricism illustrates, this position is neither in
competition with empirical science, nor does it render empirical science ir-
relevant for philosophical questions (see Carnap 1967b, §72). It just divides
the labor between empirical and linguistic work, the latter being the domain
of philosophy. As Carnap (1967b, foreword) puts it, equating linguistic and
logical analysis:
In our “Vienna Circle” [. . . ] the conviction has grown, and is steadily
increasing, that metaphysics can make no claim to possessing a sci-
entic character. at part of the work of philosophers which may
be held to be scientic in its nature—excluding the empirical ques-
tions which can be referred to empirical science—consists of logical
analysis.
As an illustration, consider a point made by Williamson (2007, §2.1)
about questions with vague predicates like ‘dry’. He argues that the question
‘Was Mars always either dry or not dry?’ is about Mars and is a philosoph-
ical question, and therefore philosophical questions are not always about
language. A lot hinges here on the concept of aboutness, but quite simply, a
positive answer to the question might be considered to entail the existence
of Mars. Whether there is such a thing is an empirical question and thus
clearly cannot be answered by language analysis or reform alone.e ques-
tion may therefore seem like a counterexample to the position of linguistic
philosophy. But in linguistic philosophy not every traditional philosophi-
cal question is considered a philosophical problem: According to linguistic
philosophy, the philosophical problem of the original question about Mars
is the problem that, rst, must be solved in order to answer the question, and
second, cannot be solved by empirical research. If Mars does not exist or if
it was always dry, there is no philosophical problem, because the original
question can be answered on empirical grounds. But if Mars rst was not
dry and then gradually became dry, the philosophical problem of the orig-
inal question is whether or under what conditions something that is rst ϕ
and then gradually becomes not ϕ is during the whole process ϕ or not ϕ.
is problem is non-empirical and at least could be a problem of language.1
Apart from this division of labor between the empirical sciences and
philosophy, linguistic philosophy goes one step further and claims that non-
empirical problems are always problems of language, that is, they cannot be
1 is treatment of the example was developed in the reading group of theeoretical Phi-
losophy Unit at Utrecht University in the winter term of 2008/2009, in particular by Har-
men Ghijsen and Jesper Tijmstra.
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solved in any other way but by language analysis or reform. us, accord-
ing to linguistic philosophy, in Williamson’s question about Mars the philo-
sophical problem can only be solved by analyzing or stipulating the use of the
terms ‘or’ and ‘not’, or by avoiding the problem altogether, say, by developing
a language without vague terms. Let me call problems that cannot be solved,
questions that cannot be answered, and statements that cannot be conrmed
by empirical or linguistic means or a combination thereof ‘trans-empirical’.2
Linguistic philosophy then claims that trans-empirical problems cannot be
solved at all. at so far no trans-empirical question has been answered to
almost everyone’s satisfaction is seen as evidence for this (see Rorty 1967a,
§1).
One purportedway to answer traditional philosophical questions even if
they are trans-empirical or lead to trans-empirical problems is the use of in-
tuition. But there are many meanings of ‘intuition’; for example, Feigl (1958,
2) distinguishes seven of them, where
[t]he common core in themany connotations of “intuition” is, of course,
immediacy. Intuition has thus been contrasted, traditionally and quite
generally, with indirect, mediate, relational, or inferential knowledge.
Intuition is oen identied with direct insight or immediate appre-
hension.
Since Feigl’smain interest is in trans-empirical claims, his discussion focuses
on the justiability of “mystical or trans-empirical intuition”, where “the tar-
get or object of the intuition is claimed to be something that is absolutely
beyond the reach of ordinary experience and reasoning, something which
cannot be checked empirically” (Feigl 1958, 6). Note that Feigl makes a clear
distinction between an intuition and its target, the target being the state-
ment for which the intuition is purported evidence. Using intuitions to an-
swer trans-empirical questions goes beyond what is accepted in linguistic
philosophy, and must be distinguished from another meaning of intuition
that Feigl (1958, 6) calls, for lack of a better word, ‘hunch’:
We can dene the “hunch”, then, as “a product of learning from past
experience, which learning is not made explicit at the moment of the
use of judgment”.
If one has a hunch, one follows an empirical rule of which one is not aware.
Hunches are therefore unproblematic, but must not be confused with trans-
empirical intuitions, because unlike the target of a hunch, the target of a
trans-empirical intuition cannot be tested empirically (Feigl 1958, 6f). In
2 In the old debate about linguistic philosophy, these problems, questions, and statements
were oen called ‘metaphysical’ or ‘speculative’, but the rst term is oen used dierently
in current philosophical discussions, and the second seems unnecessarily pejorative.
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general, “[i]f ‘intuition’ in one of its many senses designates a way of know-
ing, it need not, and indeed does not, designate such a way in some of the
other senses” (Feigl 1958, 1).
One could argue for the truth of the targets of intuitions that are shared
among many people with an inference to the best explanation. Against this,
Feigl (1958, 12f) points out that intuitions can be treated by empirical psy-
chology just like othermental states. It might then be possible to account for
the occurrence of shared intuitions, that is, to explain why dierent people
have intuitions with the same targets without having to assume their truth.
is line of research into the source of intuitions is taken up by Hare
(1975, §I), who rhetorically asks: “[H]ow do we know whether what we feel
inclined to say [about some example of a moral conict] has any secure
ground? May we not feel inclined to say it just because of the way we were
brought up to think?” For Hare, our intuitions may simply be the result of
our upbringing, and will dier accordingly.
Given the lack of consensus on trans-empirical questions and Feigl’s
hope of explaining trans-empirical intuitions without assuming the truth of
their targets, it seems that language analysis or reformmaybe the onlymeans
of rationally solving problems that cannot be answered empirically (see also
Bohnert 1963, §I). Ordinary language philosophy claims that trans-empiri-
cal problems only occur when language is not used in ordinary ways, and
therefore, the analysis of ordinary language is enough to solve philosophical
problems (Rorty 1967a, 12).
Hare (1975, §III) gives an example of this when he rejects the use of the
term ‘person’ in the discussion of the problem of abortion, because
‘person’ [. . . ] is not a fully determinate concept [.] It is no use
looking more closely at the fetus to satisfy ourselves that it is
really a person [. . . ]; we already have all the information that
we need about the fetus. [. . . ]
To say that the fetus is (or is not) a person gives by itself no
moral reason for or against killing it; it merely incapsulates any
reasonswemay have for including the fetuswithin a certain cat-
egory of creatures that it is, or is not, wrong to kill (i. e. persons
or nonpersons).e word ‘person’ is doing no work here (other
than that of bemusing us).
Hare claims that because the concept of a person is not determinate in the
case of a fetus, one should avoid the question of whether a fetus is a per-
son altogether. Trying to answer it in order to solve the problem of abortion
would be to use language in a non-ordinary way, and would therefore only
introduce trans-empirical problems because neither language nor empirical
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science can decide the personhood question. If Hare now solves the prob-
lem of abortion in some other way, he thereby dissolves the problem of the
personhood of the fetus.
According to ideal language philosophy, there are so many concepts in
ordinary language that are not fully determinate that many philosophical
problems cannot be solved in ordinary language at all. Other problems with
ordinary language include the ambiguity of words even in ordinary contexts,
and the possible embedding of false beliefs in the rules of ordinary language,
asMaxwell and Feigl (1961) argue. When applied to philosophical questions,
these problemsworsen, and so ideal language philosophers claim that philo-
sophical problems are best solved by the development of new languages and
the regimentation of ordinary terms, also called their “improvement” (Car-
nap 1963, §19), “reform” (Maxwell and Feigl 1961), or “explication” (Carnap
1962, §§2–5). Carnap (1962, §2) describes this process:
e task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less
inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the rst by
the second. We call the given concept (or the term used for it) the
explicandum, and the exact concept proposed to take the place of the
rst (or the term proposed for it) the explicatum. e explicandum
may belong to everyday language or to a previous stage in the devel-
opment of scientic language.
Finding an exact explicatum for an inexact explicandum is not a straight-
forward matter. e rst step is to describe the explicandum as precisely as
possible. is description forms the basis for the explication itself, which
Carnap (1962, §3) describes as follows:
If a concept is given as explicandum, the task consists in nding an-
other concept as its explicatum which fulls the following require-
ments to a sucient degree.
1. e explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way
that, in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been
used, the explicatum can be used; however, close similarity is
not required, and considerable dierences are permitted.
2. e characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its
use (for instance, in the form of a denition), is to be given in
an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-
connected system of scientic concepts.
3. e explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the
formulation of many universal statements (empirical laws in
the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in the case
of a logical concept).
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4. e explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as
simple as themore important requirements (1), (2), and (3) per-
mit.
e dierence between ideal and ordinary language philosophy is clear: Ac-
cording to ideal language philosophy, the analysis of a concept carried out
in ordinary language philosophy is only the preliminary step needed for an
explication in Carnap’s sense.is explication not only results in amore pre-
cise concept, but oen also in a concept that conicts with clear cases of the
originating one. As Carnap (1962, §3) notes, “one might perhaps think that
the explicatum should be as close to or as similar with the explicandum as
the latter’s vagueness permits”, but he claims that “this requirement would
be too strong” because of requirement (3). at the requirement of fruit-
fulness sometimes leads to conicts between an explicatum and clear cases
of its explicandum can be seen from “the actual procedure of scientists”, for
example in zoology’s explication of ‘sh’: “e prescientic term ‘sh’ was
meant in about the sense of ‘animal living in water’” (I would also add ‘ap-
proximately drop-shaped’), while the zoologists’ explicatummeans “animals
which live in water, are cold-blooded vertebrates, and have gills throughout
life” (Carnap 1962, §3).
It is important to note that Carnap’s discussion of explication in this pas-
sage and in many others relies on examples from the sciences. Explication is
therefore not only a philosopher’s tool. Indeed, “[p]hilosophers, scientists,
and mathematicians make explications very frequently” (Carnap 1962, §3),
which Hempel (1952, 664, §3) also points out:
Explication is not restricted to logical andmathematical concepts [. . . ].
us, e.g. the notions of purposiveness andof adaptive behavior, whose
vagueness has fostered much obscure or inconclusive argumentation
about the specic characteristics of biological phenomena, have be-
come the objects of systematic explicatory eorts. [. . . ] Similarly, the
controversy over whether a satisfactory denition of personality is at-
tainable in purely psychological terms or requires reference to a cul-
tural setting centers around the question whether a sound explicatory
or predictive theory of personality is possible without the use of so-
ciocultural parameters; thus, the problem is one of explication.
As the examples of ‘temperature’ (Carnap 1962, §§4f) and ‘mass’ (Hempel
1952, §§11f) also show, some of the fundamental concepts of science are the
results of explication.
It has frequently been pointed out by proponents of ordinary and ideal
language philosophy that the distinction between their two approaches is
only a matter of degree (for example by Carnap 1963, §19, and Hare 1960,
158), for one because the preliminary step of an explication consists in de-
scribing the natural language concept. Rorty (1967a, 12) puts it this way: “As
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has oen been (somewhat crudely, but fairly accurately) said, the only dier-
ence between Ideal Language Philosophers and Natural Language Philoso-
phers is a disagreement about which language is Ideal”. Still, each side con-
siders its own approach to be more appropriate for solving philosophical
problems, as the discussions collected by Rorty (1967b), the criticism of ideal
language philosophy by Strawson (1963), and the response by Carnap (1963,
§19) make clear.
e central charge by Strawson (1963, 504f) is that ideal language phi-
losophy’s “claim to clarify will seem empty, unless the results achieved have
some bearing on the typical philosophical problems and diculties which
arise concerning the concepts to be claried”. Bergmann (1949) counters this
kind of criticism, arguing that these problems arising in ordinary language
use need not be solved in the rst place, but can be avoided without loss.
For, the goal of an ideal language is precisely one of expressing and analyz-
ing empirical claims without leading to such problems. e ideal language
can use explicata rather than the explicanda of ordinary language philoso-
phy, and if some statement in the ideal language helps to answer a question
phrased in ordinary language, say, because the explicata involved are su-
ciently close to the explicanda, this is nice but not necessary. A supporting
position is taken up by Bohnert (1963, §II) and arguably Neurath (1932, 206),
who argue that an ideal language does not need to be translated into ordi-
nary language to be understood, because it can be learned by itself like a
natural language (cf. Carnap 1963, 938f). Rorty (1967a, 16) notes the possible
pragmatic response that the success of each of the dierent approaches will
decide its viability, and so far, ordinary language has not shown itself to be
very helpful for solving philosophical problems (see also Maxwell and Feigl
1961, 491f).
In a critique of ordinary language philosophy, Maxwell and Feigl (1961,
490f, emphasis removed) point out that “[a] large portion of philosophi-
cal problems arise from consideration of unusual cases”, and they see “abso-
lutely no reason to believe that examination of ordinary use in the ‘paradigm’,
normal cases can provide us with denitive rules for ‘proper’ use in the un-
usual and novel cases”. In other words, Strawson’s insistence on the use of
ordinary language in order to clarify philosophical problems may be exactly
why there is continuing disagreement. Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 491) state
further that the “consideration of atypical cases oen points up possible in-
adequacies and may suggest improvements in our conceptualization of the
‘normal’ cases”.is clearly marks themove from ordinary to ideal language
philosophy: If a concept is, for example, too vague to be applied in atypical
but philosophically interesting cases, this necessitates its explication, which
may lead to a concept that is applied dierently even in typical cases.
126 Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions
Mates (1958) discusses ordinary language philosophy from a point of
view that will be particularly useful in what follows: He treats the appar-
ently factual statements that are made in ordinary language philosophy like
any other empirical hypotheses, and accordingly asks how such statements
could be tested. First Mates (1958, 165) considers the claim that
the average adult has already amassed such a tremendous amount of
empirical information about the use of his native language, that he can
depend upon his own intuition or memory and need not undertake a
laborious questioning of other people, even when he is dealing with
the tricky terms which are central in philosophical problems. Such a
assertion is itself an empirical hypothesis, of a sort which used to be
invoked in favor of armchair psychology, and it is not born out by the
facts.
Mates goes on to state that many authors are not even reliable when it comes
to their own behavior, and aer noting a disagreement between Ryle and
Austin about the use of ‘voluntary’, concludes: “If agreement about usage
cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of Oxford Pro-
fessors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?”
(Mates 1958, 165)
Mates then suggests that there are essentially two empirical methods for
determining the meaning and use of a word, which he calls extensional and
intensional. e extensional method consists in observing a certain num-
ber of applications of a word and nding out what these application have in
common. Mates sees this method used almost exclusively in the ordinary
language philosophy of his time, and laments the neglect of the intensional
method. In the intensional method, the subjects are asked how they use or
what theymean by a given word, and, “in Socratic fashion”, are subsequently
presented with apparent counterexamples and borderline cases, are asked to
revise their initial response, and so on, until a fairly stable account is reached
(Mates 1958, 165f). However, Mates observes that there is no guarantee these
twomethods will yield the same results, and the only way to solve this prob-
lemmay be tomake dowith the dierentmeanings of words that result from
each method.
Furthermore, Mates argues, both methods have internal diculties. In
the extensional method, it is unclear which occurrences of a word are under
consideration, and what the relevant features are of any object to which the
word is applied. Since any set of objects will have innitely many things in
common, it is, for example, not obvious when a word has more than one
meaning. Two words might also, just by happenstance, apply to the same
objects in the domain under investigation (Mates 1958, 167f).
e problem with the intensional method is that “it does not seem pos-
sible to dierentiate in a practical way between nding out what someone
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means by aword, and inuencing his linguistic behavior relative to thatword”
(Mates 1958, 169f). Mates suggests we test this by trying to devise “Socratic
questionnaires” that make the denitions from dierent subjects converge,
and others that make them diverge. If it is possible to construct the latter,
the Socratic method cannot be considered a reliable means of nding out
the meanings of words (Mates 1958, 171, n. 11).
is doubt about the reliability of the intensional method is also voiced
by Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 489), who “know of no decision procedure for
classifying each particular case [as one of nding out or of inuencing], and
[. . . ] strongly suspect that many cases of putative ordinary-usage analysis
are, in fact, disguised reformations”. Accordingly, ideal language philosophy
cannot be dismissed on the grounds that a change of language introduces
insurmountable problems, because the intensional, Socratic method of or-
dinary language philosophy may very well lead to as much of a change of
meaning as the process of explication.e dierence between ideal and or-
dinary language philosophy then would be mainly that, while explication is
done with very specic, explicitly stated goals in mind, it is not clear how or
why the change of language is eected in the intensional method of ordinary
language philosophy.
But even though ideal language philosophers are doubtful of the possi-
bility of solving philosophical problems through ordinary language analysis,
there is no doubt that the ordinary use of terms can be determined in some
cases and that the construction of an ideal language can be inspired by or-
dinary language. Like Mates, ideal language philosophers consider claims
about ordinary language to be empirical hypotheses. Carnap (1963, §15.C),
for example, states when discussing an article of his on meaning and syn-
onymy in natural languages:
“e sentence S1 is analytic in language L for person X” [. . . ] is an em-
pirical hypothesis which can be tested by observations of the speaking
behavior of X. If anyone is still sceptical about this possibility, I should
like to refer him to a recent book by Arne Naess, which shows by nu-
merous examples how hypotheses about the synonymy of expressions
can be tested by empirical procedures.
e book, which Carnap identies in a footnote, is Interpretation and Pre-
ciseness: A Contribution to theeory of Communication (Naess 1953). It is
an empirical study of natural language, much as demanded by Mates. In his
own article on meaning and synonymy, Carnap (1955, §1) notes how such
a study of natural language (which he calls “pragmatics”) may be useful for
the logician’s development of an ideal language (which he calls “semantics”):
If he wishes to nd out an ecient form for a language system to
be used, say, in a branch of empirical science, he might nd fruit-
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ful suggestions by a study of the natural development of the language
of scientists and even of the everyday language. Many of the concepts
used today in pure semantics were indeed suggested by correspond-
ing pragmatical concepts which had been used for natural languages
by philosophers or linguists, though usuallywithout exact denitions.
ose semantical concepts were, in a sense, intended as explicata for
the corresponding pragmatical concepts.
Carnap then goes on to describe an experimental procedure for determining
the meaning of terms.
So the empirical study of ordinary language use can be of much value
for ideal language philosophers. ey do object, however, to the claim that
the results of such empirical research can show their constructed ideal lan-
guages wrong. As Popper (1963, 201, n. 44) recalls, Naess began his research
for an earlier book, “Truth” as Conceived by those who are not Professional
Philosophers (1938), “in the hope to refute Tarski” (that is, Tarski’s explication
of ‘truth’). Carnap (1948, 29, §7) replies that
Arne Ness [sic] has expressed some doubts about the assertion [that
Tarski’s explication is in agreement with the ordinary use of the word
‘true’], based on systematic questioning of people. At any rate, this
question is of a pragmatical (historical, psychological) nature and has
not much bearing on the questions of the method and result of se-
mantics.
Carnap’s opinion is shared by Popper (1963, 213, n. 64), who describes the re-
ply as “a just dismissal of the relevance of Arne Ness’ questionnaire method”.
is makes sense, given that an explication is not meant to capture ordinary
language use.
In general, ideal language philosophers see the analysis of ordinary lan-
guage as a straightforwardly empirical endeavor whose results are comple-
mentary to their own.e empirical results can serve as a starting point for
explication or as inspiration for the construction of an ideal language, and in
this respect, ideal language philosophy can prot from the analysis of ordi-
nary language. But results from this analysis will not contradict those from
ideal language philosophy, because ideal languages need not capture every
feature of ordinary language. As Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 491) put it, “ordi-
nary language is (oen) the rst word—but, quite oen, this is all that it can
do”.
3. e new debate about intuitions and experiments
Since the discussion by Feigl (1958), the use of intuition has had a remark-
able renaissance in philosophy. Hintikka (1999) spells out how Chomsky
was perceived to have based his approach to linguistics on the intuitions of
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the linguist and his success contributed to an increased use of intuition in
philosophy. Symons (2008) describes howG. E.Moore’s conception of com-
mon sense, embraced by ordinary language philosophers, became a tool in
Kripke’s trans-empirical philosophy, and hence far removed from the origi-
nal idea of ordinary language as a restriction on trans-empirical claims.is
jumbled heritage of contemporary uses of intuition has led to two distinct
forms of use. Sometimes, an intuition is considered to be a judgment of
common sense, and sometimes, intuition has an evidential role analogous
to that of perception because of its immediacy (cf. Feigl 1958).
Although the historical connections between trans-empirical and ordi-
nary language philosophy and the contemporary uses of intuition are fasci-
nating, they will not be my main focus in this section. Rather, I aim to show
that conceptually, experimental and ideal language philosophy are comple-
mentary in two very distinct ways. First, the assumptions of each approach
are supported by the other: Ideal language philosophers, in their critiques
of trans-empirical philosophy and of non-empirical approaches to ordinary
language, provide arguments in favor of experimental philosophy. e re-
sults of experimental philosophy, if correct, show the empirical premisses of
the ideal language philosophers’ critiques to be true. Second, beyond their
mutual support, the two approaches are independent, in the sense that the
results of one approach cannot prove or disprove the results of the other.
In an overview of experimental philosophy, Nadelhoer and Nahmias
(2007, §2) identify its three strains of research: experimental restrictionism,
experimental analysis, and experimental descriptivism, which can roughly
be described as determining that people’s intuitions dier, how they dier,
and why they dier in the way they do. Experimental restrictionism is a
cautionary research program, whose results have indicated gross dierences
in people’s answers to philosophical questions that have oen been consid-
ered to have intuitive answers. Experimental analysis tries to identify the
factors upon which dierences and commonalities in intuition depend, and
experimental descriptivism attempts to nd the neurophysiological sources
of intuitions.
Experimental restrictionism provides a conrmation of Mates’s hypoth-
esis that the disagreement over ordinary language use among Oxford pro-
fessors of philosophy is only one case of a wider disagreement in the general
population. When intuitions lead to dieringmoral judgments, experimen-
tal restrictionism is very much in line with Hare’s contention that there is
no reason to assume our intuitions will agree in dicult moral situations.
erefore, experimental restrictionism is a problem for the common sense
conception of intuition, and this holds whether intuitions disagree on lin-
guistic (and therefore empirical) matters, or on non-linguistic matters (be
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they empirical or trans-empirical). It also presents a prima facie problem
with the use of intuition in analogy to perception, because when there is
disagreement between intuitions, at least some of these intuitions must be
wrong, and sometimes they might all be. Analogously to perception, then,
the more experimental philosophy restricts the domain of agreement be-
tween intuitions, the less useful intuitions are as evidence for their targets.
Experimental analysis adds to experimental restrictionism, because its
results suggest that intuitions depend on social status and cultural back-
ground. ese dependencies are a concretization of Hare’s rather general
suggestion that our intuitions are a result of our upbringing.
Liao (2008) has pointed out that the results of experimental analysis have
shown some intuitions to be robust. RecallingMaxwell and Feigl’s (1961) ob-
jection to ordinary language philosophy, one can see that for Liao’s point
to be a defense of the methods of ordinary language philosophy, he must
further show that the robust intuitions are also philosophically relevant, do
not embody factually false assumptions, and do not involve concepts that
should be reformed for other reasons. However, even then, this would not
defend the wide applicability of common sense intuitions as evidence for
trans-empirical claims, that is, it would not undermine linguistic philoso-
phy itself. For, trans-empirical intuitions cannot simply be assumed to be
evidence for their targets, and whether they are evidence cannot be tested
independently. As discussed earlier, shared intuitionsmight justify the truth
of their targets by an inference to the best explanation, but as Feigl notes,
such an argument would be weakened by the existence of other explana-
tions for shared intuitions. Experimental descriptivism aims at providing
such an alternative explanation: since experimental descriptivism relies only
on empirical claims, it would, if successful, provide an explanation of shared
intuitions that does not rely on the truth of their trans-empirical targets.
Experimental descriptivism hence may eventually come to support lin-
guistic over non-linguistic philosophy by explaining shared trans-empirical
intuitions. Experimental analysis and experimental restrictionism support
those arguments against trans-empirical and ordinary language philosophy
that are based on the systematic disagreement of people’s intuitions.
Of course, trans-empirical philosophy and ordinary language philoso-
phy have both been defended against criticisms from experimental philoso-
phy. In defense of trans-empirical philosophy, Sosa (2007, 101) proposes an
account of intuitions that gives them an evidential status analogous to per-
ception (though he disavows the perceptual model of intuition), applicable
to any kind of statement. He bases his analogy between intuition and per-
ception on competence: On his proposal, “to intuit that p is to be attracted to
assent simply through entertaining that representational content. e intu-
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ition is rational if and only if it derives from competence, and the content is
explicitly modal”.ere is “no very deep reason [for the restriction tomodal
propositions]. It’s just that it seems the proper domain for philosophical
uses of intuition”. An intuition is thus the (possibly irrational) inclination to
agree with a proposition. e rationality of an intuition, that is, the justi-
cation for believing its target to be true, stems from competence. Referring
to Sosa’s conception of intuition, Symons (2008, 87f, §8) argues that compe-
tence can be established by empirical research: “[T]he lasting signicance
of experimental philosophy is not that it undermines appeals to consensus,
but that it opens a fertile eld of inquiry into our commonsense or intuitive
capacities”. Specically, “determining the boundaries of our competence is
the most fruitful task that lies ahead for experimental philosophy”.
e important question then is the source of the competence claim, and
here Feigl’s distinction between trans-empirical intuitions and hunches be-
comes important. For hunches, competence can be established by empiri-
cally testing the statement for which the hunch is supposed to be evidence.
Claiming competence then amounts to claiming a correlation between the
occurrence of a hunch and the truth of its target. It is this correlation that can
be the object of empirical study, and thus of experimental philosophy. Ex-
periments done on hunches have demonstrated systematic mistakes among
children, laypersons, and experts, as Nadelhoer and Nahmias (2007, 125,
129) point out, and optical illusions cause systematic mistakes in the case
of perception, so competence cannot simply be assumed. erefore, even
if there is a successful analogical argument from competence in the case of
hunches or perceptions to competence in the case of trans-empirical intu-
itions, the latter suer, according to the analogy, from systematic mistakes
as well.
Since trans-empirical intuitions cannot be tested like hunches or per-
ceptions, competence claims are outside the realm of experimental philos-
ophy and empirical research in general, and have to be established in some
other way.is needs to be done in order to show that trans-empirical intu-
itions are indeed evidence for their targets in the same way perceptions are,
and that therefore linguistic philosophy is mistaken. If competence claims
cannot be established, there may also be no other justication to prefer one
person’s intuitions over another’s. Without such a justication, empirical re-
strictionism’s results cannot be rendered irrelevant by considering only pre-
ferred intuitions. Further justications pending, the results of experimental
philosophy therefore support linguistic philosophy, that is, pose a problem
for trans-empirical philosophy.
In a critique of experimental philosophy, Kauppinen (2007) argues that
ordinary language philosophy can only be pursued by what Mates calls the
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intensional method, and claims that experimental philosophy is in princi-
ple restricted to the extensional method. e latter claim is decisively criti-
cized by Nadelhoer and Nahmias (2007), who point out the possibility of
devising the Socratic questionnaires that Mates suggests for the intensional
method. Kauppinen’s criticism hence loses its force against experimental
philosophy. It is still noteworthy, though, that with this claim Kauppinen
moves away from the historical practice of overly relying on the extensional
method, which was lamented by Mates, to the other extreme of excluding it
completely.
Kauppinen further argues that the intensional method can be expected
to yield converging results because people can communicate. However, as
Mates has pointed out, this argument does not establish that people use
words with the same meaning they would settle on via the intensional met-
hod. Whether there is such a convergence of meaning is very much an em-
pirical question, to be tested, for example, by the method Mates proposes.
And even then, that agreement exists in some cases does not imply agree-
ment in the dicult ones, as Maxwell and Feigl have noted. In their reply to
Kauppinen, Nadelhoer and Nahmias (2007, 144, n. 36) state as much.
Concluding his critique, Kauppinen (2007, 110) claims that “assessing
the truth of intuition claims can remain a relatively armchair business [. . . ].
We are entitled to have condence in such reection, since we take a lot of
real-life experience of using concepts to the armchairwith us”.at is, the in-
tensional method can be replaced by recourse to the investigator’s intuitions
about the use of her native language.e argument is rejected by Nadelhof-
fer and Nahmias (2007, 129) once again with Mates’s point that Kauppinen’s
claim is an empirical one that must be tested.
Without having established the possibility for the ordinary language
philosopher to rely on her intuitions alone, Kauppinen is forced to accept
Mates’s intensional method as the only viable one.erefore, Mates’s worry
about this method becomes acute: It is not clear how to distinguish between
nding out and inuencing what someone takes a word’s meaning to be.
Kauppinen (2007, §5.1) himself notes that one is “never free of the danger
of leading the witness in the direction favored by the questioner”, but does
not suggest a way to avoid this inuence. As detailed above, Maxwell and
Feigl turn this into an argument for ideal language philosophy by suggest-
ing that there is no such way, while Mates at least thinks that one can test
this empirically.
In their argument for ideal language philosophy, Maxwell and Feigl go
beyond simply arguing that in the intensional method, ordinary language
philosophy cannot help but reform language. ey hold that philosophers
should reform language, because ordinary languagemay not be good enough
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to solve or dissolve philosophical problems. Philosophical language must
contain explicata, not explicanda. It is this reliance on explicata, and con-
structed languages more generally, that ensures the independence of ideal
language philosophy from folk intuition, just as the analogical consideration
mentioned in the beginning suggests. Underlying the analogy is a general
statement that holds for natural sciences, mathematics, and jurisprudence,
as well as for ideal language philosophy:ey apply constructed languages,
and many of their concepts are explicata for the explicanda of ordinary lan-
guage. Even if a word occurs in both constructed and ordinary language,
it will therefore typically have dierent meanings in each. For this reason,
Carnap and Popper can dismiss Naess’s experiments on ordinary language
as irrelevant to Tarski’s explication of ‘true’, and ideal language philosophy
can be pursued largely independently of the results of contemporary exper-
imental philosophy.
is dismissal of folk intuitions does not simply shi the authority to
the experts’ intuitions, though. eir intuitions about the application of an
explicatum can be checked by using the rules for an explicatum’s use, which
must be laid down precisely. is was already remarked upon very early
by Carnap (1967a, §100) in a discussion of the rational reconstruction of
concepts in philosophy and the sciences:
e fact that the synthesis of cognition, namely, the object forma-
tion and the recognition of, or classication into, species, takes place
intuitively, has the advantage of ease, speed, and obviousness. But
intuitive recognition (e. g., of a plant) can become useful for further
scientic work only because it is possible to give, in addition, the in-
dicators (of the particular species of plant), to compare themwith the
perception and thus to give a rational justication of intuition.
Experts’ intuitions about how an explicandum should be explicated can be
checked against Carnap’s requirements for explication, and in principle, any-
one may suggest and use a new explicatum according to expedience, as long
as this new concept is clearly distinguished from existing ones.
Experimental philosophy is not useless for ideal language philosophy,
however. To the extent that experimental restrictionism establishes actual
disagreement in the application of concepts, it identies areas where an ex-
plication is clearly needed, and experimental analysis can help by identify-
ing an explicandum as a starting point for such an explication. In general,
experiments on ordinary language can bear all the fruits for ideal language
philosophers that Carnap (1955) lists in the quotation in section 2. Experi-
mental philosophy is relevant for ordinary language philosophy, and to the
extent that ordinary language philosophy is relevant for ideal language phi-
losophy, so is experimental philosophy.
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Ideal language philosophy can be challenged, of course. Kauppinen (2007,
96) and Nadelhoer and Nahmias (2007, 130) cut to the core of the debate
between ordinary and ideal language philosophy when they echo the claim
by Strawson (1963) that ideal language philosophy does not solve the right
problems if it does not capture the concepts of ordinary language. However,
rst, the preceding discussion shows that even ordinary language and ex-
perimental philosophy may not capture ordinary language, and second, the
responses by Bergmann (1949) and Maxwell and Feigl (1961) to Strawson’s
argument in the old debate within linguistic philosophy show that this may
not be a problem in the rst place. I do not want to claim that Kauppinen,
Nadelhoer, Nahmias, and Strawson are wrong. But I do want to claim that
Nadelhoer, Nahmias, and Kauppinen are jumping to conclusions, given
that the discussion between ordinary and ideal language philosophy starts,
but does not end, with Strawson’s criticism.
4. Final remarks
e conceptual conclusions of this paper are ve-fold:
First, the results of experimental restrictionism and analysis show that
ordinary language has the features that the ideal language philosophers con-
jectured in their criticisms of ordinary language philosophy. ese results
therefore support the criticisms’ empirical premisses. By establishing the
divergence of intuitions, experimental restrictionism and analysis further
undermine the status of intuitions as evidence for claims about ordinary
language in particular, and the viability of ordinary language philosophy in
general.
Second, the arguments and suggestions by ideal language philosophers
aboutmethods of ordinary language analysis support experimental philoso-
phy. Mates’s criticismof armchair linguistics andCarnap’s approval ofNaess’s
method of inquiry are cases in point.
ird, the results of experimental philosophy support linguistic philos-
ophy. is is because the results of empirical restrictionism and analysis
suggest that intuitions do not provide a means of reaching agreement on
trans-empirical matters. Furthermore, experimental descriptivism may of-
fer explanations of those cases where trans-empirical intuitions agree. So
experimental descriptivism may come to support Feigl’s criticism of the de-
fense of trans-empirical philosophy by showing his empirical premiss to be
true.
Fourth, the defenses oered by proponents of ordinary language and
trans-empirical philosophy fail to address the criticisms given by ideal lan-
guage philosophers. Specically, the defense of intuitions as a display of
competence fails to address the dierence between hunches and trans-empi-
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rical intuitions. e analogical consideration oered in the introduction,
when developed into an argument based on the use of explication, supports
ideal language philosophy. And the defense of ordinary language philoso-
phy that stresses Socratic dialoguemakes ordinary language philosophy into
a rough kind of ideal language philosophy without explicit goals.
Fih, while the justications of experimental and ideal language philos-
ophy provide mutual support for each other, the two approaches are also,
to a large extent, methodologically independent, so that ideal language phi-
losophy can be pursued mostly without taking the results of experimental
philosophy into account. Experimental philosophy is like any other empir-
ical science in that its results cannot be shown false by suggesting new ex-
plicata (or, more generally, new constructed languages) and conversely, the
constructed languages of ideal language philosophy cannot be shownwrong
through the results of experimental philosophy.
ese are the conceptual results. My historical point illustrates that the
old debate about and within linguistic philosophy is extremely relevant for
the current one, in that it anticipates some recent arguments, and even goes
beyond the state of the current discussion in some respects. Some of the
arguments brought forth may be decisive, but my quick overview cannot do
justice to the sophistication of the old debate.
is relevance of the old debate, and indeed much of linguistic philos-
ophy, has been questioned. In the context of the new debate, Knobe (2007,
120) argues in defense of experimental philosophy that the emphasis on “rel-
atively technical discussions of questions about language and logic” in the
philosophy of the 20th century, and especially the focus on “a relatively nar-
row range of problems involving logic, meaning and the extension of cer-
tain concepts”, was “a catastrophic mistake”. Instead, philosophers “should
go aer the traditional problems with everything we’ve got”, where the “tra-
ditional” problems are those of human nature.
Of course, not all traditional problems concern human nature (ques-
tions about determinism and the fundamental constituents of matter come
tomind). But even for those that do, it is not clear that they can be answered
through experimental work alone. As Nadelhoer and Nahmias (2007, 126,
§2) state, “[i]n addition to reporting the results of their studies, experimental
philosophers also explore background issues such as [. . . ] the role that [in-
tuitions] should play in philosophy [. . . ] and what responses are available to
theorists whose views do not settle with folk intuitions”.e results of these
explorations will not always be empirically testable themselves, and hence
they are in the realm of linguistic philosophy, because, as pointed out above,
linguistic philosophy is about the division of labor between empirical work
and language analysis and reform; it does not ignore empirical work. In the
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case of ideal language philosophy, this is especially obvious. Carnap (1967a,
§§67, 122), for example, considers his constructional method for explicat-
ing all scientic concepts with the help of some basic perceptual concepts
to be compatible with any empirical result about the nature of perception,
and the explications he chooses are based on the psychological theories of
his time. At most, there exists a terminological disagreement between ex-
perimental and ideal language philosophers over the methods that should
be called ‘philosophical’. As the quotation by Carnap (1967b) from section 2
shows, ideal language philosophers would not include any empirical meth-
ods in their explication of ‘philosophical’; experimental philosophers would,
obviously.
Knobe therefore goes wrong when he assumes that linguistic philosophy
is only interested in questions about language. Its results are intended to
be compatible with—and indeed complement—the results of the empirical
sciences, even results like those that Knobe (2007, 121) reports:
[T]he experiments seemed to be showing [. . . ] that moral consider-
ations played a role even in the most basic concepts people used to
understand their world. e implication was that people’s ordinary
way of understanding the world might turn out to be radically dier-
ent from the sort of understanding we normally seek in the sciences.
is goes beyond, but is very much in keeping with, an earlier claim:
Wedonot frequently assign qualities of emotions or volitions as prop-
erties to things in the outside world. is is due to the scientic ori-
entation of our thinking, which aects us in this way, even outside
of science, in daily life. We must assume, however, that to decline
this assignment is only the result of a process of abstraction and does
not hold from the outset. In the uncritical conception of a child, the
apple does not only taste “sourish”, but also “delicious” or even “like
more”. [. . . ] Furthermore, an apple looks “begging for a bite”, a face
looks “pushing for a punch”, a noise is “to run away from”, since these
objects cause volitions of the appropriate kind.
Here, only children are expected to apply concepts that involve emotions or
volitions to objects, while Knobe (2007) suggests that most people do. But
the basic conjecture is nonetheless that the distinction between objective
facts and aective judgments is the result of an abstraction, not a feature of
our experience. And this is not Knobe speaking, it is Carnap (1967a, §133).3
3 Somehow, I nd the German original (Carnap 1998) more delightful:
Unserem wissenschalich geschulten Denken liegt es auch außerhalb
der Wissenscha, im täglichen Leben, fern, Gefühlsqualitäten oder Wol-
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